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Migration is one of the most unpredictable demographic processes. The aim of
this article is to provide a blueprint for assessing various possible forecasting
approaches in order to help safeguard producers and users of official migration
statistics against misguided forecasts. To achieve that, we first evaluate the various
existing approaches tomodelling and forecasting of internationalmigration flows.
Subsequently, we present an empirical comparison of ex post performance of var-
ious forecasting methods, applied to international migration to and from the
United Kingdom. The overarching goal is to assess the uncertainty of forecasts
produced by using different forecasting methods, both in terms of their errors
(biases) and calibration of uncertainty. The empirical assessment, comparing
the results of various forecasting models against past migration estimates, con-
firms the intuition about weak predictability of migration, but also highlights
varying levels of forecast errors for different migration streams. There is no single
forecasting approach that would be well suited for different flows. We therefore
recommend adopting a tailored approach to forecasts, and applying a risk man-
agement framework to their results, taking into account the levels of uncertainty
of the individual flows, as well as the differences in their potential societal impact.
KEYWORDS
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uncertainty1 | INTRODUCTION
Forecasting migration flows is characterised by high
levels of error, higher than for the other components of
demographic change: fertility and mortality (Bongaarts
& Bulatao, 2000), yet these errors are of crucial impor-
tance for overall population forecasts (idem; Long,
1991). There are many social, economic, political and- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
reative Commons Attribution Lice
ed by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.environmental drivers which impact migration flows
(Massey et al., 1993), yet there is no single, robust migra-
tion theory that can be used for forecasting purposes
(Arango, 2000). Migration is also susceptible to events
that are difficult to predict in terms of timing and
impact, such as changes in the economic cycle, policies
or political circumstances. Besides, even if credible expla-
nations of past migration flows existed, their tenets- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
nse, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the
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2 BIJAK ET AL.would be difficult to extrapolate into the future – for that
reason, most of the formal forecasting models rely on
time series analysis, be it frequentist or Bayesian
(Azose & Raftery, 2015; Bijak, 2010; Bijak & Wiśniowski,
2010; Cappellen, Skjerpen, & Tønnessen, 2015; de Beer,
1993, 2008; Wiśniowski, Smith, Bijak, Raymer, &
Forster, 2015).
Given the inherently uncertain nature of future events,
and the history of shock changes to migration flows, the
main aim of this paper is to provide a blueprint for
assessing possible forecasting approaches to help safe-
guard producers and users of official migration statistics
against misguided forecasts. To do so, we evaluate the
various existing approaches to forecasting of migration
flows, and present an empirical comparison of ex post per-
formance of various forecasting methods, applied to inter-
national migration to and from the United Kingdom
(UK). Even though we focus on international mobility,
the findings and general recommendations also apply to
internal migration, which typically exhibits more stable
and regular features (an observation made since
Ravenstein, 1885), yet still can have considerable volatil-
ity (see e.g. Raymer, Abel, & Rogers, 2012). Throughout
this paper, ‘migration’ is thus used as shorthand for
‘international migration’. Besides, the terms ‘forecast’
and ‘prediction’ are used interchangeably; ‘projections’
being reserved mainly for the results of deterministic cal-
culations of future population size and structure under a
set of specific assumptions (Keilman, 1990).
This paper considers three sources of uncertainty in
migration forecasts: the inherent uncertainty of future
events, errors in the data (Section 2), and uncertainty
related to relying on a particular forecasting model
(Section 3). In the empirical analysis, various models are
compared based on their forecast errors and the accuracy
of calibration of the forecast uncertainty (Section 4). The
results obtained for forecasts using data leading up to
the two major ‘shocks’ observed for UK international
migration patterns – the enlargement of the European
Union (EU) in 2004; and the economic crisis in 2009 –
are subsequently presented (Section 5) and assessed using
a forecast assessment algorithm we outline. Finally, we
make recommendations related to the usefulness of vari-
ous forecasting approaches for policy‐makers, with focus
on the role of uncertainty (Section 6).2 | UNCERTAIN MIGRATION,
UNCERTAIN DATA
A vital consideration in forecasting migration is how to
incorporate uncertainty into the estimates. There are
three broad sources of uncertainty we consider in thispaper. The first one is the inherent uncertainty about
future events. Some level of error in migration forecasting
is always inevitable, as any inference about the future is
made under uncertainty (Alho & Spencer, 1985).
The second source of uncertainty is associated with
migration data. Sources of migration data from different
countries are often based on differing definitions (Raymer,
Wiśniowski, Forster, Smith, & Bijak, 2013). The available
data are often inaccurate, inconsistent and incomplete.
Migration into and out of the UK is no exception. The pre-
cise volume of internationalmigration flows are difficult to
measure; data collection systems used to record migrants
often produce biased and inaccurate estimates (Disney,
2015; Kupiszewska & Nowok, 2008; Willekens, 1994;
Wiśniowski, Forster, Smith, Bijak, & Raymer, 2016).
Related to that is the uncertainty in how migration is
operationalised – as net or gross figures, for each area
separately or jointly for a multiregional system, as crude
numbers or rates, the latter additionally involving uncer-
tainty in the population at risk (see e.g. Raymer et al.,
2012).
The third source of uncertainty comes from the fore-
casting models. Applications of different models to the
same data can produce different forecasts, including dif-
ferent assessments of the uncertainty of the predictions.
If the forecasts from various competing models are com-
bined using formal criteria, additional uncertainty about
the model is introduced (Bijak & Wiśniowski, 2010).
In the UK, the main source of data on long‐ and short‐
term migration is the International Passenger Survey
(IPS). The IPS is supplemented by a range of administra-
tive data: Home Office statistics on refugees and asylum
seekers, new National Insurance Numbers (NINo) issued
to foreign nationals by the Department of Work and Pen-
sions, and data on foreign students from the Higher Edu-
cation Statistics Authority (HESA). At the moment, there
is not much quantitative data on emigration from the UK
except for the IPS, especially available in the public
domain, although the situation is changing, with the
increasing availability of data on exit checks. These data
are already collected by the Home Office and shared with
the Office for National Statistics for analytical purposes,
such as those related to the numbers of international stu-
dents in the UK (Home Office, 2017).
Each of the sources of data can be assessed in relation
to the concept of ‘true flow’ (Raymer et al., 2013;
Wiśniowski et al., 2016), defined as the unknown number
of migrants that is being estimated under a given defini-
tion of a migrant. It represents the number that one
would obtain if one was able to monitor the given defini-
tion of immigration perfectly, without bias and under-
count, and with complete coverage of the population.
For the purpose of this paper, the concept of a true flow
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tional migration, whereby:“A person who moves to a country other
than that of his or her usual residence for a
period of at least a year (12 months), so that
the country of destination effectively
becomes his or her new country of usual
residence.” (UN, 1998, p. 18)The data quality and uncertainty in each source can be
assessed in relation to this ‘true flow’ definition, by using
the following analytical categories (Disney, 2015; Raymer
et al., 2013):
• Definition – how closely the data align with the stan-
dard UN duration of stay criteria for long‐term
(12 months or more) and short‐term (3–12 months)
migration;
• Coverage – conceptually, what portion of the total
immigration flow the data set can cover, and are there
any population excluded from the measurement by
design (e.g. students or irregular migrants);
• Bias – whether there is any systematic bias as a result
of the way the data are collected, such as an under-
count of the number migrants due to the lack of
incentives for them to register;
• Accuracy – with regard to its intended purpose, how
accurate the data are, for example with respect to
the sampling error, or other inaccuracies not covered
above.
The main source of the UK migration statistics – the
IPS – is a sample survey, thus disaggregation of the data
by countries of origin or destination of migrants can have
high margins of error resulting from sampling of respon-
dents. This is especially important given the small num-
ber of survey contacts declaring migration intentions –
just over 3,000 in 2016 – leading to standard errors above
3% for the total immigration and emigration estimates,
and much higher for individual flows by sex, age or coun-
try of citizenship (ONS, 2018). In addition, there can also
be bias in the numbers related to the way the data are col-
lected, with the initial focus mainly on the largest airports
and Channel crossings having caused problems after the
2004 enlargement of the European Union. Additionally,
the long‐term IPS estimates are based on the questions
about the intended (rather than actual) length of stay in
the UK or abroad, which is another cause of a bias in
the estimates. There is a clear trade‐off between the typi-
cally more accurate administrative sources, which how-
ever only offer crude proxies for immigration flows and
migrant stocks, and the conceptually clearer survey‐basedmeasures, such as the IPS. Overall, the assessment of the
different sources of data on UK immigration according to
these four criteria is summarized in Table A1 in the
Appendix, and details are provided in Disney,
Wiśniowski, Forster, Smith, and Bijak (2015).3 | REVIEW OF EXISTING
METHODS
Existing migration forecasting methods usually involve
either deterministic scenarios, or various types of proba-
bilistic models, including time series and econometric
models. Most official projections prepared by statistical
offices in developed countries or international organisa-
tions remain deterministic, and are based on judgemental
scenarios (Bijak, 2010; de Beer, 2008). The main criticism
of these methods is that they do not allow for a coherent
and explicit quantification of uncertainty in their estima-
tion (Wilson & Rees, 2005). For scenarios, even though it
is possible to calculate ex post errors, it is not possible to
assess whether they are well calibrated in the probabilis-
tic sense, i.e. whether the ex ante statements about the
chances of errors of different magnitudes match the error
frequencies observed ex post. As in such studies there is
typically no ex ante statement of the likelihood of specific
outcomes, there is nothing to calibrate the distributions of
these errors against. For this reason, existing examples of
these approaches are not included in the empirical assess-
ment presented in this study.
On the other hand, probabilistic forecasts specify the
chances for future migrations to occur, given a set of
assumptions about the underlying probability distribu-
tions (Alho & Spencer, 1985; Bijak et al., 2015), and quan-
tify at least some of the sources of uncertainty mentioned
before. These assumptions also depend on expert judge-
ment, but typically on the likelihood function and model
parameters (error variance, autoregression parameters,
and so on) rather than future values, as is the case with
scenarios. The standard approach to time series extrapo-
lation is to apply ARIMA (autoregressive integrated mov-
ing average) models, typically within the frequentist
(likelihood‐based) statistical paradigm (see de Beer, 1993
and 2008, for examples, and Bijak, 2010 for an overview).
Another group of time series models, dating back to Stoto
(1983), relies on extrapolating past errors in forecasts,
rather than data per se. Examples of analysis of past fore-
cast errors include Shaw (2007) for the United Kingdom
and Keilman (2008) for a group of European countries.
The ARIMA models can have a longer or a shorter
‘memory’, depending on the parameters, and can exhibit
different properties with respect to their stationarity. In
demographic forecasting, the order of the ARIMA models
4 BIJAK ET AL.usually does not go beyond (1,1,1) (Keilman, 2001).
ARIMA models include an estimate of forecast uncer-
tainty via confidence intervals. To some extent, this takes
into account the second source of uncertainty outlined
previously – uncertainty in the data. The main theoretical
criticism of frequentist ARIMA models is that the fore-
casts are based on data alone and that it may lead to
unreasonable predictions, especially in the presence of
shock events, when the underlying processes are clearly
non‐stationary.
In comparison to data‐driven time series extrapola-
tions, Lutz and Goldstein (2004) developed ‘expert‐based
probabilistic population projections’, where subjective
expert judgement alone is used to prepare expert fore-
casts. If a structural break can be anticipated, such as
the enlargement of the EU, the average trajectory may
be modified (e.g. increased) at the time point of the break.
A purely expert‐based approach does not make full use of
data, which is a major limitation given that data on previ-
ous flows is the best source of evidence available to
forecasters.
A Bayesian approach allows inclusion of expert opin-
ion within a statistical model. Following Bijak (2010), in
this approach, historical trends, expert judgements and
various model specifications can all be combined in a
probabilistically coherent way (Bijak & Wiśniowski,
2010). This is especially important when the data series
are too short to allow for a meaningful classical inference
(Bijak & Wiśniowski, 2010). Theoretically, Bayesian
approaches allow the forecaster to incorporate all three
elements of uncertainty in their estimates. As such, they
are the main focus of our empirical testing methods later
in the paper. Recently, Azose and Raftery (2015) proposed
a method for probabilistic projection of global net inter-
national migration rates with Bayesian hierarchical first‐
order AR(1) models.
Econometric models can both predict migration and
verify economic theories on the basis of empirical data
and covariate information. One example is a model by
Dustmann, Casanova, Fertig, Preston, and Schmidt
(2003) forecasting net migration after the EU enlarge-
ment in 2004 based on scenarios in relative income per
capita. Their approach assumed stationarity of the errors,
and did not take into account the effect of allowing free-
dom of movement for the new EU citizens. Such model
specification led to large ex post errors for migration into
the UK, but yielded relatively accurate predictions for
Germany – one of the countries that imposed transitory
restrictions on access to its labour market. This illustrates
the importance of treating migration as a non‐stationary
process where systemic ‘shocks’ are expected. An alterna-
tive approach for modelling such shocks relies on includ-
ing dummy variables for such past events (Cappellenet al., 2015; de Beer, 1993), but even then the key issue
with unpredictability of such shocks remains – and the
approach can be argued to suppress the predictive uncer-
tainty as a result.
Finally, an example of a modelling approach which
includes demographic explanatory variables is a gravity
model, where population sizes act as ‘masses’ drawing
people over spatial distance (Cohen, Roig, Reuman, &
GoGwilt, 2008). Some aspects of this approach can be
criticised, as the time‐invariant predictors, for example
the distance or area, can inform forecasts about the struc-
ture of the future flows, but not about their magnitude.
On the other hand, forecasting magnitude alone is not
sufficient for obtaining robust predictions of inter‐country
migration. For the purpose of this study, given that we
concentrate on a single destination country, these models
are structurally identical to other econometric
approaches, and are therefore omitted from the empirical
evaluation exercise.4 | METHODOLOGY
4.1 | Framework for the empirical
research
There is no clear agreement, both amongst practitioners
in national statistics offices and in the academic litera-
ture, about which type of probabilistic (stochastic) fore-
casts produce the ‘best’ results (Bijak, 2010). From the
main approaches proposed in the literature, a range of
candidate stochastic models has been applied to the data
discussed in Section 2.
The empirical analysis has been carried out whenever
the combinations of data sources and forecasting methods
has been deemed to be ‘readily applicable’, not requiring
additional information such as the elicitation of expert
opinion. For all the models, the variable being forecast
is the annual number of (gross) migrants in year t as mea-
sured in a given data source, denoted as mt, log‐
transformed to ensure positivity. For presentational sim-
plicity, and also because overall migration flows are more
directly relevant to policy decisions than those disaggre-
gated by sex, age, or individual countries of origin (rather
than legally‐defined groups of countries with varying
levels of immigration restrictions), the exercise is based
on total migration flows. The following three groups of
models are considered.
i. Extrapolation of time series using ARIMA models
For long enough series (as a rule of thumb, at least 20
observations), we have examined a suite of five different
BIJAK ET AL. 5ARIMA models, for the different migration processes
under study, mt. First, we have estimated a general,
unconstrained autoregressive model of the first order,
AR(1), given by (1) below, with a constant c, describing
a stationary process whenever the autoregression param-
eter φ ∈ (−1, 1):
ln mtð Þ ¼ cþ φ ln mt−1ð Þ þ εt: (1)
Second, we have examined a special case of (1), a non‐
stationary random walk with drift c, with φ = 1. Third,
we have estimated an ARMA(1,1) model given by (2),
with a moving average element added to the AR(1) model
above, with an additional parameter θ. Here, the model
equation is:
ln mtð Þ ¼ cþ φ ln mt−1ð Þ þ εt þ θεt−1: (2)
Fourth, we have estimated another AR(1) model (1),
but based on differences in log‐transformed volumes of
migration flows mt. Finally, we have examined an AR(1)
model explicitly assuming the underlying linear trend
(hence, ‘de‐trended’), given by (3) below, which can be
re‐expressed as a modified version of (1), with a new con-
stant and an additional time‐dependent term, b([1 − φ]
t + φ):
ln mtð Þ ¼ cþ bt þ φ ln mt−1ð Þ − c − b t − 1½ ð Þ þ εt
¼ c 1 − φð Þ þ b 1 − φ½ t þ φð Þ þ φ ln mt−1ð Þ þ εt:
(3)
In all variants of (1)–(3) the individual error terms εt
are assumed to be independent and identically (normally)
distributed.
The second group of models is essentially the same as
the one listed above, with the addition of expert‐based
information through prior distributions (Section 5.2).
The models in this group have been estimated using
Bayesian, rather than frequentist (likelihood‐based) sta-
tistical methods, in order to allow for a coherent and fully
probabilistic integration of expert information with the
observed data. For longer series, all five models listed
above have been used; while for shorter series the exer-
cise was limited to the first three models (random walk,
general AR(1) and ARMA(1,1)). Any expert judgement
included in a Bayesian time series model via the priors
relates to the interpretation of the model parameters.
For example, if an expert believes a given flow is non‐
stationary, then for an autoregressive term in the model,
a prior distribution that allows a given parameter to take
a value of 1 or above is appropriate.
Clearly, without the expert judgement, any estimates
of the structural parameters of ARIMA models based on
short time series, not to mention assessments ofstationarity, are problematic and can even be difficult to
identify. Besides, such short series are still the norm in
quantitative migration studies. For these reasons,
instead of discussing the parameter estimates of the time
series models, we focus on presenting a detailed
comparison of the empirical performance of the resulting
forecasts.
ii. Econometric models with covariates (ADL)
Autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models are exten-
sions of the autoregressive (AR) models described in (i)
and (ii). They utilise past values of migration, as well as
current and past values of explanatory variables, in this
case, changes in the unemployment rate (ut) and gross
national income (GNI, gt), to predict current values of
migration. The model, with parameters β0 – β3 related
respectively to the contemporaneous and lagged unem-
ployment rates and GNI, is specified as:
ln mtð Þ ¼ cþ φ ln mt−1ð Þ þ β0ut þ β1ut−1 þ β2gt
þ β3gt−1 þ εt: (4)
To forecast future values of migration, ADL models
require point forecasts of the explanatory variables. Since
more than one of such point forecasts can be fed into the
model, this approach can be considered as scenario‐based
forecasting. In this exercise, we first assumed a ‘perfect
foresight’, and have used the actual values of the
explanatory variables (unemployment rates) in the
models. In parallel, we have also used the forecasts of
these variables available from the Office for Budget
Responsibility (OBR, 2015).
iii. Extrapolation of time series through propagation of
historical forecast errors
The past errors for the UK net migration have been
estimated by looking at the previous ONS assumptions
for various editions of National Population Projections
since 1970, and comparing them with the IPS‐based net
migration estimates across a range of projection horizons,
from one to ten years. There is an apparent regularity in
the forecast errors, which increase (in absolute terms)
almost linearly with the forecast horizon (Figure 1). The
above‐mentioned regularities are observed along the hori-
zon dimension, which then requires translating into the
period dimension. An additional difficulty here is that
the raw data have a ‘triangular’ form: for earlier forecasts,
more observations across different horizons are available
than for the most recent ones. To mitigate that, the anal-
ysis has been restricted to forecast errors for up to ten
years ahead.
FIGURE 1 Average error and its
standard deviation by projection horizon,
past official net migration assumptions for
National Population Projections, 1970‐
based to 2012‐basedSource: Government
Actuary's department and Office for
National Statistics [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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for net migration (nt) have been considered, with et,h
denoting empirical errors observed for a forecast made
in year t with a horizon of h years, so for the year t + h.
The models for errors have been estimated alongside the
horizon dimension, but assuming common features for
different time periods. The formal specification of these
models is as follows:
et;h ¼ γ þ et;h−1 þ ξ t;h and ntþh ¼ n − hγ þ∑hx¼1et;x (5a)
et;h ¼ γ þ et;h−1 þ ξ t;h and ntþh
¼ nt þ h c − γð Þ þ∑hx¼1et;x (5b)
et;h ¼ b0 þ b1hþ ξ t;h and ntþh
¼ nt þ hc − b0 þ b1hð Þ½  þ∑hx¼1et;x (5c)
In the above model equations, n is an average value of
net migrations from the most recent five years of observa-
tions, γ is the drift term for the random walk model for the
errors, b0 and b1 are the respective linear trend parameters,
and ξt, h is a normal noise term for the model for the errors.
Finally, c is the drift term for the random walk for net
migration, modelled as in the special case of (1), with
φ = 1. The interpretation of these models is as follows:
• Model (5a) assumes a random walk with drift for
empirical errors from the past, and a constant forecast
of net migration (n), assuming an average value from
the most recent five years of observations. In this case,
the error drift is not propagated into the forecasts.
• Model (5b) is also a random walk with drift for the
past errors, coupled with another random walk withdrift for net migration, with error in the forecast
period assumed to follow the estimated model for past
errors, allowing for drift;
• Model (5c) contains a linear trend for errors by hori-
zon, and a random walk with drift for net migration,
with error in the forecast period assumed to follow
the error model, with a trend.
All net migration models have been estimated on a
natural (not log‐transformed) scale, as net migration can
assume negative, as well as positive values. It has to be
noted that models (5a) – (5c) are based on net migration,
which is an artificial measure conflating flows in different
directions, as this is the variable which is used in the offi-
cial population projections for the United Kingdom,
despite being considered theoretically and conceptually
inferior than gross migration (Bijak, 2012).4.2 | Assessment of models
The models detailed above have been compared across a
range of quality indicators. For errors, the following
summary measures have been calculated, in the spirit of
similar comparisons done in the past (e.g. Keilman &
Kučera, 1991):
• Mean Percentage Error (MPE), which measures
relative bias;
• Mean Absolute Error (MAE), capturing absolute
magnitude of error;
• Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), which additionally
penalizes large errors.
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percent and 80‐percent intervals has been computed, that
is, the ex post frequency with which the actual observations
fall into the respective ex ante error intervals. In well‐
calibrated models, we expect the empirical frequencies to
be close to the respective nominal coverage probabilities –
50% and 80%, respectively. If the models are too conserva-
tive, the predictive intervals are too wide: more than 50%
(80%) actual observations would be falling into the respec-
tive intervals, which should be narrower. Conversely, if
the models are too optimistic, the predictive intervals are
too narrow, and less than 50% (80%) actual observations fall
into the respective intervals, which indicates that they
should be wider. This second situation is potentially more
problematic, as it may lead to too risky decisions.
As previously mentioned, a key theme of the paper is
how to safeguard against making bad migration forecasts
under uncertainty of future events, data and models. In
particular using the forecasts based on truncated data to
reproduce the observed reality is an opportunity to evaluate
forecasting approaches against the inherent uncertainty of
future events – the main source of uncertainty outlined in
Section 2. For that reason, two different truncation points
were chosen where events could lead to significant struc-
tural breaks in migration flows, and therefore where the
effect on the magnitude of migration is uncertain.
In particular, the analysis has been performed (1) on
the series truncated in 2008, allowing the calculation of
the ex post errors and empirical frequencies for five years
of observations (2009–2013), and (2) for longer data series
only, also with observations truncated in 2003, with ten
years of data for comparison (2004–2013). The earlier
truncation point, 2003, is the last year in the time series
before the expansion of freedom of labour movement
within the EU in 2004 and the later one, 2008, is the
starting year of the global financial crisis and subsequent
recession. In most cases, we would expect the models to
perform better in the periods of higher stability, with
fewer and smaller structural breaks. Detailed results
across the above set of five quality indicators are reported
in Appendices A and B.
To assess each of the models and to summarise our
empirical results, we have developed the following algo-
rithm. First, the errors and coverage measures have been
described by a range of qualitative codes related to the
MPE and to calibration of both 50‐percent and 80‐percent
intervals. MPE has been selected here over other mea-
sures of error (MAE, RMSE) as an indicator of forecast
bias, which is readily comparable across different series.
The following models were included in the analysis: ran-
dom walks, general AR(1) and ARMA(1,1) models, AR(1)
estimated on differenced series, as well as de‐trended
AR(1) models – all in the frequentist and Bayesianversions. Furthermore, for long non‐stationary series,
ADL(1) with predicted covariate (unemployment rates)
and with ‘perfect foresight’, as well as three models for
past errors propagation were estimated: with random
walk errors based on constant and random walk migra-
tion forecasts, and with a linear trend in errors.
The exercise was carried out both for five years and ten
years of data available ex post (on series truncated in 2008
and 2003), except for the short series, where the evalua-
tion could have been performed only for five years. Simi-
larly, the ADL(1) models with forecasted predictors were
only included for series truncated in 2008, as no similar
data on the predictions of the economic variables were
available for earlier years. Overall, the assessment of per-
formance is based on the results of 198 models. They
included five ARIMA models, each estimated for nine
groups of flows (four inflows, four outflows, and asylum
seekers), both in the frequentist and Bayesian approaches,
for the series truncated in 2003 and 2008. Additionally,
three past error models involving net migration and two
econometric ADL models were estimated, each for both
truncation points, as well as eight other specific series
for 2008 only. A detailed summary of the models and
series used is shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Once the quality classes have been obtained for all
models, they have been converted into numerical scores,
penalising the models with high overall MPE errors
and/or those being miscalibrated. A ‘symmetric’
conversion table has been used, where the error (bias)
and calibration have been deemed similarly important
and penalised to a similar degree. Finally, average scores
have been calculated separately for each of the three
categories of data: (i) long stationary series, (ii) long
non‐stationary series, and (iii) short series, for
appropriate models under study.
The average scores have been ultimately given a cate-
gorical quality rating: high (green) for the relatively most
appropriate methods for data series exhibiting particular
features; medium (orange) where the application of such
models needs to proceed with caution; and low (red) for
those that are definitely not recommended, based on high
likelihood of high errors and/or problems with calibra-
tion. A detailed summary of the scores given to different
combinations of errors and calibration outcomes is
offered in Table A3 in the Appendix.5 | RESULTS
5.1 | A summary of empirical results
The summary of the empirical results is offered in Table 1
and selected examples are illustrated in Figure 2. Note
1See, for example, the IMEM estimates (Raymer et al., 2013), available at
http://www.imem.cpc.ac.uk.
TABLE 1 Results summary table for forecast biases and calibration of errors
Key: (Green) low errors and good calibration; (Orange) middle‐sized errors and reasonable calibration; (Red) high errors and/or poor calibration.
8 BIJAK ET AL.that for short series, only Bayesian models could be real-
istically used, as the data need to be augmented by
expert judgement. We observe that the forecasts can
vary greatly in terms of median forecasts, which is
reflected in the error measures (for example, the MPE),
and uncertainty around the median, which results in
different calibration scores. In the summary table and
graphs, the assessments have been assigned ‘colour’
codes, ranging from ‘green’ for models producing rela-
tively small biases and good calibration, to ‘red’ for fore-
casts that are either highly miscalibrated or are highly
biased, with ‘orange’ in between. In this exercise,
bias and calibration have been considered similarly
important.
The supporting documentation available at Disney
et al. (2015) additionally provides detailed results assum-
ing that the errors higher weight over calibration, which
are generally similar, if slightly more favourable to the
ARMA and ADL models for longer series of data.
For longer series that exhibit stationary characteristics,
the AR(1) or ARMA(1,1) models lead to relatively small
forecast errors and well‐calibrated predictive intervals.
This is a direct consequence of the fact that these models
yield forecasts that converge to some constant value over
time with a constant uncertainty, which is a requirement
for stationarity. Random walk with drift model intro-
duces ever‐increasing uncertainty and the ever increasing
(or decreasing) level of future migration, which may
result in relatively large errors and poor calibration.
As an example, for non‐stationary series, e.g. those for
migration from the new EU member states, the more reli-
able models, such as the AR(1) models with additional
expert input, predicted that there was a 50 per centchance that the average annual immigration between
2004 and 2013 would range from 100 to 200 thousand
people. In reality, this was likely just above 150,000.1
These errors can be illustrated by forecasts of British
immigration based on 1975–2003 data (Figure 2, graphs
a–h). The AR(1) model produces constant forecast at
around 95,000 with the uncertainty intervals remaining
at a similar level for each year of the forecast (graph a).
For the RW model, the width of the predictive intervals
and the level of migration increase with every year of
the forecast (graph b). For non‐stationary series, such as
Asylum Seekers (graphs c and d) and immigration from
the EU countries (graphs e and f), the RW model may
provide more realistic assessment of uncertainty, but still
does not guarantee small forecast errors, as non‐stationary
series may change the direction “randomly”. Finally, the
econometric models with ‘perfect foresight’ of unemploy-
ment produced reasonable errors, but with far too
pessimistic uncertainty assessment (graphs g and h).
Only when the underlying series were relatively stable,
such as for migration of UK nationals, were some models
able to produce relatively small errors – in other situa-
tions, the applicability of various methods was either
limited, or inappropriate, depending on the exact circum-
stances. In particular, no model was able to predict
migration well if the underlying data series were short,
or in the presence of shocks (structural breaks), such as
the enlargement of the European Union.
Full results of the empirical forecast exercise for
individual models and data series are reported
FIGURE 2 Examples of the empirical assessment for selected data series truncated in 2003 Notes: ‘AR(1)’ denotes the autoregressive
model given by (1) and ‘ADL(1)’ the autoregressive distributed lag model (4). ‘PI’ refers to the bounds of the respective 50‐, 80‐ and 90‐per
cent predictive intervals. Data source: Office for National Statistics for graphs (a) (b) (e) (f) (g) and (h); Home Office for (c) and (d), for various
years. Predictions computed by the authors [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
BIJAK ET AL. 9alongside detailed error and coverage indicators in
Disney et al. (2015).5.2 | Sensitivity analysis
One of the three main sources of uncertainty outlined in
Section 2 is the uncertainty associated with the forecast-
ing model themselves, and different models produce
forecasts of varying quality for given time‐series. Further-
more, each forecasting model is based on certain assump-
tions, both statistical and related to expert opinion. There
is no single, objective and ‘correct’ approach to forecast-
ing migration as each approach is based on different
assumptions and these assumptions can affect the calibra-
tion of the uncertainty in the model, the error, and also
the magnitude of the forecast.In this section, brief illustrative examples of forecast
sensitivity to prior assumptions for the Bayesian time
series models, expert knowledge for EU immigration
flows and applications of the econometric models to spe-
cific migration flows are assessed. Given the large num-
ber of models for different dis‐aggregations of migration
flows and sources of data, the aim of this section is to pro-
vide examples of how alternative model assumptions can
affect migration forecasts.
i. Sensitivity to Prior Assumptions
As mentioned in Section 4, the prior distributions in
Bayesian time‐series models relate to a judgement of the
statistical properties of the particular time series to be
modelled. Forecast sensitivity to changing prior assump-
tions of the AR(1) model for total inflows was tested for
time series truncated both in 2003 and 2008.
FIGURE 2 Continued.
10 BIJAK ET AL.We introduced various assumptions about the prior
distributions for both the autoregressive term and the
overall error term in the model. We assumed such prior
distributions that give preference to data, as well as dis-
tributions that impose stationarity of the time series.
For the total migration flow measured by the IPS, the
forecasts are largely insensitive to the prior distributions.
For the forecast to be significantly affected by the expert
knowledge, the judgement about particular statistical
properties (e.g. stationarity) incorporated in the prior dis-
tribution would have to be strong and well‐justified, and
the corresponding prior distribution would need to be
very tight, allowing minimum error. In particular, mak-
ing such assumptions should not be driven by conven-
tion, analytical convenience or tractability, as the
presented comparison of stationary and non‐stationary
models has shown. Besides, the prior assumptions on sta-
tionarity should not be generalised without proper reflec-
tion, as this property may not hold for each different
disaggregation and source of data. In general, the moreobservations in the data set are available, the less impor-
tant expert opinion is. If only relatively few data points
are available, subjective opinions will play a more prom-
inent role.
ii. Sensitivity to Expert Knowledge
The potential of expert opinion is demonstrated in rela-
tion to the category of flows from the EU. The definition
of this category changes over time due to the enlargement
of the EU in 2004 and 2007, when flows from the new EU
member states are added to the flows from the old EU‐15.
We focus on the first of the breaks as it brought about a
significant change in the series.
In particular, we supplement the five time series
models described before with basic “expert knowledge”
based on the population size of the EU before and after
the 2004 enlargement. Forecasts for the period 2004–
2013, based on the 1975–2003 series, are rescaled by
multiplying the drift term c in the model by the ratio
BIJAK ET AL. 11of the EU population size after the 2004 enlargement to
the population size before 2004, measured in 2003. This
reflects a crude assumption on the change in the
expected level of the EU flow, based on a notion of pop-
ulation gravity. Of course other specifications are possi-
ble, including taking advantage of the prior knowledge
of which countries would open their labour markets to
the citizens of the new EU member states, although this
knowledge was not included in the contemporaneous
forecasts of Dustmann et al. (2003). Also, as of 2003,
the date of the next enlargement in 2007 is treated as
unknown.
The results vary depending on the model. An improve-
ment in accuracy of the forecasts is observed in the AR(1)
and ARMA(1,1) models, where the MPE is significantly
reduced compared with the MPE for models without
expert knowledge. In the random walk, de‐trended
AR(1), and AR(1) models on differences, reduction of
error is, however, only minimal.
In summary, these results show that expert opinion
can be of value as a supplement in migration forecast-
ing. This appears to be especially true in relation to sit-
uation where there is a breakpoint in time series data,
such as the one which occurred with the 2004 enlarge-
ment of the EU, or which shows the first signs of occur-
ring following UK's ‘Brexit’ from the European Union,
with a recent decline in immigration from other EU
countries and a sharp increase in emigration (ONS,
2018).
iii. Sensitivity of the econometric models
The results of the econometric models suggest that
there is a link between the unemployment rate and total
flows as measured by the IPS, as well as flows from the
EU‐15, and that unemployment rates can help predict
migration. To assess the quality of these forecasts, we test
the model with various configurations of the simulta-
neous and lagged unemployment rate together with the
Gross National Income (GNI) as a macroeconomic proxy
measure of wage dynamics and economic performance
(Abel, 2010). The results suggest that the GNI is not sig-
nificant. Thus in the final forecast it has been removed
from the model.
Incorporation of (1) simultaneous, (2) lagged, and (3)
both simultaneous and lagged unemployment rates lead
to different paths of the forecasted migration. The forecast-
ing errors, however, remain similar in all three configura-
tions. The fact that the unemployment rate can be used as
a predictor for migration triggered a hypothesis that it
actually influences only migration related to labour. To
analyse this hypothesis, we utilise the IPS data on total
labour migration (1977–2013). On one hand, the resultsconfirm explanatory power of the unemployment rate.
On the other hand, forecasts based on the series truncated
in 2003 and 2008 become biased as they fail to predict the
downturn in labour migration after the economic crisis in
2008.
This result confirms that migration is a complex
process that may be influenced by various social and
economic circumstances in different periods of time and
taking place in various places of the world. Even if a
covariate, such as the unemployment rate, can explain
its past behaviour, it does not guarantee unbiased
and precise forecasts. Moreover, migration for family
reasons usually follows labour migration, which may
be driven not only by the relative economic situation of
the sending and receiving countries, but also by the
existing networks in the receiving country. Therefore,
following de Beer (2008), we advocate applying econo-
metric models to specific flows, rather than aggregates.
Also, due to the nature of predictions based on projected
values of the covariates, the forecasting horizon should
remain short and depend on the length of the available
series. This is in line with earlier suggestions (Bijak &
Wiśniowski, 2010), although clearly longer‐term projec-
tions, such as those produced by national statistical
offices, would need to rely on different methods, such as
scenario‐based ones.
Scenarios might have limited predictive capacity
and be strongly dependent upon expert judgement,
although statistical models also rely on their underpin-
ning assumptions. Besides, scenario‐based methods
can be probabilistic as well, involving expert judgement
on the magnitude of errors, and in any case should
include at least qualitative statements on the likelihood
– for example using categories of uncertainty (low,
medium, high, extreme) to describe the underlying
assumptions.
For short‐term forecast horizons, another promising
research avenue is related to early warning models,
which would seek to detect the signs of structural
changes in migration trends in response to the dynam-
ics of some other variables, for example macroeconomic
indicators (unemployment, job vacancies) or policies
(migration caps, visa regulations, etc.). Such models
could be also used to test the possible responses of
migration flows to different policies by allowing the
decision makers to compare the results of different
interventions. The outcomes could be subsequently
analysed by using risk management tools – combining
the potential policy impacts of such interventions with
their uncertainty – to help policy makers make prudent
and robust decisions.
An example of such a risk management matrix for
different migration flows is provided in Table 2, with
TABLE 2 A stylised example of a risk management matrix related to migration forecasts, from the point of view of possible policy impacts
Key: (Green) low policy concern; (Orange) moderate policy concern; (Red) high policy concern.
12 BIJAK ET AL.traffic‐lights colour coding this time corresponding to
the importance of managing the flows of different char-
acteristics in terms of their uncertainty and impact. The
key policy focus should be on the red and orange areas
– those with either substantial uncertainty, or having
higher impact of the volume of different types of migra-
tion on a range of social and policy areas, such as on
the resources needed for the processing of applications
or for integration efforts. One such ‘red’ area, with the
highest impact and uncertainty, is asylum‐related migra-
tion – in this context, a discussion of the potential for
using early‐warning models is included in the recent
report for the European Asylum Support Office (EASO,
2017).6 | CONCLUSIONS
Migration is a very complex and multi‐dimensional pro-
cess, responding to many different drivers. Thus, its fore-
casting is extremely difficult. When tested on empirical
data from the past, all models under study produced con-
siderable uncertainty, but for some the prediction errors
were much larger than for others. Even in such cases
some models performed better than the other ones:
models that did not assume stability of trends, when none
was to be expected, at least described the forecast uncer-
tainty more accurately – and thus more honestly.
Following the results of the empirical analysis, we rec-
ommend a general process for migration forecasting. This
is based on the three types of uncertainty outlined earlier
and the following assessment of the publicly available
data; main methodological approaches; and then the
empirical forecast results. Importantly, the recommenda-
tions focus on the process of making migration forecasts
rather than recommending a single model. As shown in
the analysis of the forecast results, different models
appear to perform either relatively well or relatively
poorly, dependent on the nature of the data series. Conse-
quently, it would not be prudent to recommend any one
model as the ‘best model’ for all situations.The recommended process has three steps:
1. A thorough understanding of the features of the par-
ticular migration flow
With regard to the three categories of uncertainty
outlined in Section 2 this relates to the inherent uncer-
tainty of migration itself. For example, the migration flow
of interest could be susceptible to external political or
economic shocks, or particularly influenced by changes
in government policy or other interventions, or, con-
versely, could be a flow which is relatively stable over
time. The distinction can go beyond stability and should
ideally encompass other features of migration as well.
As suggested by de Beer (2008), different types of flows,
including e.g. asylum, labour, family, or student migra-
tion have different characteristics, and need to be ideally
studied separately. Understanding the potential future
nature of the flow, will help guide appropriate selection
of a forecasting model(s).
By the same token, there is inherent uncertainty in
the assessment of a specific migration flow's potential
volatility to changes in policy. In any case, the forecast
uncertainty should allow for the possibility for future
changes in the migration flow of interest (Pijpers,
2008), the magnitude of which would be dependent on
the specific type of flow. This approach would aid policy
makers in any decisions based on a migration forecast.
One may expect different policy responsiveness of the
different types of flows. For example, asylum flows, gen-
erated by war and conflict in other parts of the world,
can be expected to be less stable than return flows of
the UK nationals, and the respective policy impacts of
these two flows will also differ.
2. Formal assessment of the available data, their
strengths, weaknesses and uncertainty
This consideration relates to the second source of
uncertainty outlined in Section 2 – the uncertain nature
of migration data itself. One of the conclusions from
BIJAK ET AL. 13the empirical analysis is that migration forecasts based on
short time series, or series that were subject to shocks in
the past, are problematic. Where the forecasts are esti-
mated using a Bayesian times series approach, with a
low number of observations, the forecasts are strongly
influenced by the specification of the priors, and a thor-
ough sensitivity analysis becomes imperative.
In the context of the UK, it is clear from the data
assessment that there are inconsistencies and uncer-
tainties inherent in each of the sources. There is therefore
a need to extend the research agenda to include the
harmonisation of the publicly available data to a common
“true flow” denominator before forecasting (Disney, 2015;
Raymer et al., 2013). Ideally, how each source of data dis-
torts the value to be estimated – the future true migration
flow – needs to be taken into account in the forecasts.
Specifically in the United Kingdom, further advances
in improving the quality of international migration sta-
tistics may come from: making a fuller use of adminis-
trative data sources (Bijak, 2012; Boden & Rees, 2010),
including data on border crossings and exit checks,
where important developments have taken place in the
recent years (Home Office, 2017); use of data from other
countries in a harmonised and systematic fashion
(Raymer et al., 2012); application of statistical modelling
to take advantage of different data sources (Disney,
2015; Raymer et al., 2012). Recent recommendations
for UK migration and population data are available in
Raymer, Rees, and Blake (2015).
3. Selection of a modelling approach appropriate for the
type of migration and the available data
The final recommendation relates to selecting appro-
priate models to forecast the flow of interest, taking
into account its characteristics – especially, what type of
flow this is, how stable or susceptible to shocks, whether
the series exhibit non‐stationary features. The length of
the available data series is an important consideration
as well. In particular, series with non‐stable characteris-
tics, such as asylum flows, should not be forecast by using
models which assume stationarity of the process, and vice
versa, stable labour migration between two highly devel-
oped countries have more orderly features than a non‐
stationary model would predict. Short data series may
require additional expert input concerning the future
migration or the features of the processes.
On the whole, the main findings of this paper suggest
that, given the high levels of uncertainty of migration fore-
casts, this uncertainty should be stated explicitly, ideally in
terms of probabilities. Further work in this area, instead of
trying to do the impossible and design the ‘best possible’
migration forecasting method, should rather focus ontranslating uncertain forecasts into decisions, creating
early warning systems, and providing risk management
strategies. The prerequisite is an honest reporting not only
of forecasting uncertainty, but also of the related features of
the type of migration under study and of the forecasting
models, including their past performance and susceptibil-
ity to shocks. For longer horizons, scenario‐basedmethods,
especially involving probabilistic scenarios, could provide
an alternative to statistical extrapolations, but they too
would need to be carefully justified and calibrated.
Furthermore, the whole forecasting process could also
become more interactive, with forecasters providing
bespoke decision advice related to specific user needs
(Bijak, 2010; de Beer, 1993). For example, it is possible
to utilise a formal statistical decision analysis to support
migration‐related policies and decisions under uncer-
tainty (Alho & Spencer, 2006; Bijak et al., 2015). Here,
the advice given to policy makers based on forecasts
would also include information on the relative costs of
under‐predicting and over‐predicting migration when
making specific policy or other decisions (Bijak, 2010).
Other elements of the research agenda aimed at
enhancing the predictive capacity of various migration
models include building computer simulations with solid
micro‐foundations, whereby migrant decisions in
response to policies could be modelled explicitly
(see Klabunde & Willekens, 2016 for an overview of
agent‐based migration models). Such an approach would
be particularly helpful in setting realistic and potentially
interactive migration scenarios, as discussed above.
Following the process outlined above cannot guaran-
tee that the resulting forecasts will exhibit smaller
errors, but would help safeguard against making poor
forecasts and thus also radically incorrect decisions. It
is especially vital that the forecasters remain honest
about the limitations of their product, and do not offer
methods producing too certain predictions, as they will
most likely fail, but neither should the decision makers
expect or require them. The main conclusion from the
presented analysis is that the various statistical models,
such as time series, should be used with caution, their
properties being tailored for the characteristics of partic-
ular migration flows and for the available data, with
due attention paid to the implications of various explicit
and implicit model assumptions. With migration often
being a politically‐charged topic, these caveats are
becoming more important than ever.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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Detailed information on the forecast assessment
exerciseTABLE A1 Quality assessment of the main data series on the UK
migration flows
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LFS: Immigration − O O −
NINo (DWP):
Immigration
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HESA (students)c:
Immigration
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2011 census data:
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− * + +
Key: + close match to the true flow; O moderate distortion of the true flow;
− major distortion;
Notes: a Long‐term migrants encompass those who arrive (or leave) with the
intention to stay in the country (or abroad) for twelve months or longer;
b Short‐term migrants include those who arrive (or leave) with the intention
to stay in the country (or abroad) for three months or longer; c Students who
had their domicile outside of the UK before commencing their studies
(source: HESA, www.hesa.ac.uk).
*Exact match for the legally‐defined category in question (asylum seekers).
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TABLE A3 Summary of scoring rules for classifying different forecasting models into quality categories
Note: The average scores under 3 fall into the (green) category, with low errors and good calibration; scores between 3 and 5 to the (orange) category, with
middle‐sized errors or reasonable calibration, and scores of 5 or above to the (red) category, with high errors or poor calibration.
*Scores for calibration classes – empirical coverage of the nominal 50‐per cent and 80‐per cent intervals:
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